2006-10-13 Karlskrona

Security in Europe, spring term 2003, UTA
Lecturer: Arto Nokkala

Presentation Group 4, Yi Fang & Georg Dembowski, subject:
OSCE, Council of Europe and other institutions as security providers

Version of 05.03.2003

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The General Analysis Of The OSCE, CFSP, The Council Of Europe And The WEU (Yi Fang)

Introduction

Every social organization has a constitution (Borchardt, 2000). Concerned to the EU, there are several policies and institutions. For policy-makers and academic strategists in the West during the Cold War, the nature of security was unproblematic. Security was the absence of war with the Soviet Union (Rees, 1993, pp. 71). But with the end of the Cold War, the first-order question of the nature of security is firmly on the political agenda. The question is no longer how much military power is required for security; rather it is the relationship between military power and security.

The management of military security has two aspects. The first concerns policies to meet threats and risks to security, the second concerns institutions (Rees, 1993, pp. 83). To deal with the second aspect first, four main institutions appear to have survived the Cold War and may play a role in the future of European Security: NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the WEU (the Western European Union), the OSCE (the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the EC (the European Community) (the EC explicitly denied itself a security role during the Cold War). Moreover, the Council of Europe and CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy in Europe) have been set up to deal with policies and the “Soft Security” in the future Europe.

Whether these institutions are in competition with each other, or whether they can complement each other is unclear (Rees, 1993). The WEU, for example, has been seen as complementary to the EU, but in other respects it may be in competition with NATO. The role of these institutions may be portrayed in terms of overlapping circles of interest – that each institution covers certain areas and membership patterns, some of which may be unique to that institution but others may be shared with one or more other institutions. The degree of overlap has yet to be codified into a complementary system, and may still prove to be confused and competitive.

After so many years of experience and numerous treaty reforms, we must ask ourselves why CFSP has had such a difficult history compared to the undoubted progress made in the Community sector (Hill, 1993, pp. 305 - 28). How are the NATO, WEU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, adapted in the future EU?

One other question is worth noting concerning these security institutions. None of them are new bodies, all being products in some form or other of the Cold War. That they were created to satisfy the requirements of the Cold War does not necessarily mean that they are inappropriate for post-Cold War Europe, but it does raise questions over their future relevance (Rees, 1993, pp. 84). NATO has been attempting to develop more of a political focus, though it has failed to expand its membership beyond its Cold War origins. The WEU has been attempting to raise its profile as a distinctively European military institution, and may act as a bridge between NATO and the EU, or indeed may become the military arm of the EU. The OSCE has been attempting to gain a more active role in European security, and particularly in conflict management, but appears to be severely handicapped by the general requirement for unanimity in its decision-making (Rees, 1993). The EU is edging towards a common military policy as part of CFSP, but the process is not set in concrete and given the number of problems likely to be encountered may easily be derailed.

In this paper we study firstly the basic European institutions, the WEU, OSCE, the Council of Europe, which have something to do with security. Secondly we analyse the relationship of these institutions, NATO and the European Union. We evaluate critically strengths and weaknesses of each of them. We ask questions, how these institutions are being developed? What kind of security these institutions present? Which or what kinds of states find these institutions important for their security? Our key idea is that the evolutionary process of the NATO, WEU, and the CFSP has yet to realize a satisfactory outcome, while no new institution has emerged to manage military security in Europe.

The General Analysis Of The OSCE, CFSP, The Council Of Europe And The WEU

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (WWW document). The OSCE and the Council of Europe pursue, on an equal footing and according to their own working methods, a common goal: the promotion of stability on the basis of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights in Europe.

The field presence that the OSCE maintains in a number of geographical areas provides the Council of Europe with information, and the Council of Europe experts and specialists provide support to OSCE activities. Recently, a “Common Catalogue of Co-operation Modalities” between the OSCE and the Council of Europe was elaborated, aimed at guaranteeing institututional memory and ensuring that existing good practices are not forgotten or lost. On a political level, at OSCE meetings, the national delegation of the Member State holding the Presidency of the European Union speaks on behalf of all States that make up the European Union. The Ministerial Council (formerly the Council of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)), whose members are the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating States, meets once a year towards the end of every term of chairmanship (but not usually in years when there is a Summit) to consider issues relevant to the OSCE and take appropriate decisions.

The actual tasks of missions vary considerably, depending on the mandate agreed with the host country. The main focus is on building democracy and civil society by enhancing safeguards for human rights and the rights of minorities, fostering dialogue especially between different ethnic groups, assisting in negotiations on autonomy arrangements and in conducting elections. For the first time the Kosovo Verification Mission (which has already come to an end) assumed the additional function of monitoring a ceasefire.

Following the end of the Cold War the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe established in 1975 by the Helsinki Final Act became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE; official change of name on 1 January 1995), which has assumed increasingly operational functions. Participating States include all European countries as well as the Soviet Union successor states, the USA and Canada (55 countries in all; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (suspended in 1992) was readmitted in November 2000). The OSCE is hence the most comprehensive security organization in Europe. Since 1996, OSCE and NATO have been engaged in an expanding process of political interaction and co-operation. Regular contacts take place between the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the North Atlantic Council. OSCE officials regularly participate in NATO meetings such as those of the Political-Military Steering Committee/Ad Hoc Group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping, while the NATO Secretary General (or one of his representatives) attends appropriate OSCE meetings.

Efforts towards European unification in the foreign affairs and security areas are, however, as old as efforts toward European economic unification (Fabre, 1996). European Political Cooperation (EPC), already sketched in Fouchet’s 1962 Plan, but made official only after 1970, was structured around periodic meetings of heads of state and government to consult on foreign policy issues.

In overall terms, moves towards unification in Europe since the Second World War have created a confusing mixture of numerous and complex organizations that are difficult to keep track of. For example, the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Council of Europe, the European Union coexist without any real links between them. The number of member countries in these various organizations ranges from 10 (WEU) to 44 (Council of Europe) (Borchardt, 2000, pp. 5).

In the EU Treaty, the Heads of State or Government have now agreed to gradually develop a common foreign and security policy with the following declared aims:

  1. Safeguarding the commonly held values, fundamental interests and independence of the EU;
  2. Strengthening the security of the EU and its Member States;
  3. Securing world peace and increasing international security in line with the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations, and the principles and aims of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris, which in 1994 were embodied in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);
  4. Promoting international cooperation;
  5. Promoting democracy and the rule of law, and safeguarding human rights and basic freedoms.

The strategy that has been chosen is to gradually integrate the Western European Union in the European Union’s institutional framework (Paul & Hall, pp. 162). The WEU, initiated by France and the UK, was the first cooperative defensive structure to develop at the end of the Second World War (Dumoulin, 1995). Like many other political and military initiatives of that time, its aim was to safeguard Europe from a potential new German aggression. It developed independently of the European Community until the drafting of the Treaty of Maastricht, which for the first time mentions defense as an object of European foreign affairs and security policy, to be conducted through the WEU.

The WEU was until the 1980s little more than a consultative forum subordinate to NATO, where security and arms production issues were regularly discussed. Since the 1980s, however, several initiatives have been taken to strengthen the role of the WEU in the process of European integration (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 162).

Some obstacles need to be overcome before the WEU becomes the EU’s defense arm. In particular, the WEU suffers from a problem of “double jurisdiction”. On the one hand, it is called upon to act as the defense arm of the EU; on the other it is supposed to be subordinated to the defense strategy outlined by NATO (Paul & Hall, pp. 162). It is thus not clear what the WEU would do if it received contradictory instructions from the EU and NATO. Another major obstacle is that of the WEU’s operativeness. Without clear guidelines regarding the WEU’s power to call on military forces and the way they should be financed and deployed, the WEU will remain a consultative body unable promptly to translate EU policy into action.

The United States organized cooperation in Europe along two axes, the NATO, that would ensure defense against the Soviet Union, and the OEEC, that would administer the funds allocated by the Marchall Plan. Beyond this, it allowed Europeans to organize their cooperation as they wished, even encouraged European integration, as long as two conditions were fulfilled: subordination of any military organization to NATO’s security plans for Europe and the reconstruction of Germany’s economy and military. These requirements were needed to guarantee the permanence of Germany as part of the West and the participation of Germans in the defense of Western Europe against communism (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 165).

The most rational solution, that is the one that minimized sovereignty loss and maximized military security, was the one that was eventually reached: preservation of national armies; German rearmament; and integration of Germany into both the WEU (in 1954) and NATO (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 167).

What is important is that a large segment of the French political elite, comprising both those who proposed the EDC plan and those who rejected it, really believed in the threat represented by Germany, and their strategic choices corresponded to these beliefs.

The CFSP, NATO, The WEU And The EU

The ambition to create a European foreign and security policy is a goal that runs parallel to the entire history of the integration process, from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1952) to our own day, marked by the fourth major revision of the Treaty of Rome, which instituted the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) (Westlake, 1998, pp. 61). But, contrary to the history of the Community, attempts to cooperate in the foreign policy field have suffered a series of setbacks and resurrections. The Treaty of Maastricht (7 February 1992) was the first serious attempt made to “communitarise” European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This attempt should have been completed in the space of five years (Article N – 48), but this process has remained incomplete, and today it is still difficult to speak of a common foreign policy in the strict sense (Westlake, 1998).

The study of international relations has focused on the contexts that facilitate or hinder cooperation between states and on the role that institutions play in international politics (Keohane, 1984). More recently, scholars have begun to study the choice between alternative cooperative strategies when actors have different preferences and have only limited information about the consequences of alternative courses of action (Morrow, 1994). In order to study European integration, it might be more fruitful to treat the intergovernmental and the integration approaches as two alternative forms of cooperation or coordination strategies, and to discuss issues of cooperation intensity, efficacy, and solidarity as another type of problem (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 156).

Integration became the solution to a problem for which no other solution of an intergovernmental nature had been found or agreed upon. States were pooling sovereignty, however, in order to strengthen their legitimacy at home rather than because of their Europeanism (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 169). So, we can basically apply the idea in the CFSP sphere while we are sure that the EU has outlined priorities in the foreign affairs and security area, which are objectives and cannot be attained within a specific time period. There is no need to creat specific arrangements that will accelerate a particular process, as was the case with the creation of the internal market (EEC).

In explanation of the lack of integration in the field of foreign affairs and security policy, four main hypotheses can be mentioned (Hoffmann, 1991). The first is that lack of integration is due to the existence of the NATO umbrella, which guarantees Europe’s security. From this hypothesis follows the conclusion that an integrated European foreign affairs and security policy is not needed. The second hypothesis is that sovereignty in foreign affairs and security policy is more central to states than is sovereignty in other areas. The third one, based on the realist “balance of power” hypothesis, is that European foreign affairs and security policy is not integrated because the bipolarity that characterized the Cold War turned the NATO solution into the most rational cooperation strategy for Western European states. A stronger European foreign affairs and security policy would have disrupted the fine balance achieved by the two superpowers. The last hypothesis is that the interests of the European Union member states are too different from each other to permit very close cooperation, let alone integration.

Bonvicini argues that the real reason why CFSP has had such a difficult history, probably, is tied to contingent historic factors, which have set European foreign policy in one given ideological context of integration rather than another. European foreign policy has traditionally been viewed as an expression of the “cooperative”, as opposed to the “integrative”, ideology (Westlake, 1998, pp. 62).

European Political Cooperation (EPC) was conceived in 1970 by a protocol of agreement among the member governments. For this reason, EPC lacked authentic legal status. It is very different from the EEC, in terms of appearance on the European scene. There was no autonomous executive, no assembly, and no voting procedure. To avoid confusion with Community institutions, the Council of Foreign Ministers was initially called “Conference”, while remaining identical in composition.

From the institutional and legal standpoint, the two structures (EPC and EC) are totally different from each other. The EC was born out of a compromise between the federal and confederal philosophies. For EPC the question never even arose. EPC only answers to the need to enhance the visibility of Europe’s role in the world and to complement economic integration with political integration (Westlake, 1998, pp. 63). In functional terms, EPC was based on a pragmatic method of incremental development of its organs and activities, adding from time to time, on the basis of its experiences, new procedures and new organs to make it external action more effective (Bonvicini, 1988, pp. 49 - 70). EPC’s primary problem was that of its relations with pre-existing structures of the EEC. The rapprochement between the two “legs” of Europe’s external activity, the economic and the political, was achieved very gradually and with a significant dose of mutual suspicion. The application of the “consistency” concept and, subsequently, the addition of an increasingly clearer security dimension to foreign policy created the dilemma of whether EPC was drawing nearer to the EC or whether the EC was advancing towards EPC. This question loomed large, particularly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and remains topical to this day.

It is not only about the sovereignty of states but also, more importantly, the political interests of each EU member state in the foreign affairs and security policy sphere. Integration in the foreign affairs and security policy area has proceeded more slowly than it has in the economic area because no foreign affairs and security policy objective has arisen that was of such urgency that the EU member states, unable to find a commonly agreed intergovernmental solution, would be open to persuasion by advocates of an integrationist solution (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 173 - 174).

It is not established that foreign affairs and security policy is more central to the sovereignty of states than is sovereignty on economic affairs. In fact, public support for a European army and a common European foreign affairs policy is very strong, especially in Germany, where it is even stronger than support for a European currency (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 157). An integrationist strategy does not necessarily mean a loss of sovereignty. Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann argue that the European Community can best be viewed as a set of complex overlapping networks, in which a supranational style of decision-making, characterized by compromises upgrading common interests, can under favorable conditions lead to the pooling of sovereignty (Keohane & Hoffmann, 1992, pp. 277). Integration and the preservation of sovereignty are not a zero-sum game, as long as states are present in the integrated structures that are created and as long as integration of some spheres increases the states’ control over their internal affairs.

Under the second and third pillars of the EU (common foreign and security policy, and cooperation between police and judicial authorities in criminal matters) the powers of the Community institutions are limited to encouraging and supporting collaboration agreed on between the Member States themselves in the Council of Europe. There has been no transfer of powers from the Member States to the Community institutions; instead, the Member States remain directly responsible for their joint foreign and security policy and for cooperation between their police and judicial authorities in fighting crime. They have nevertheless also given undertakings to cooperate further and pursue joint courses of action at EU level while working within the Community’s institutional framework (Borchardt, 2000, pp. 29).

 

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The Council Of Europe, Europol, ESA, EAR, And Others (Georg Dembowski)

Introduction

In the following, CoE, Europol and some other European institutions are introduced. Most of them have nothing to do with traditional "hard" security issues and some are usually not at all associated with (even braod) security. These are especilly interesting and therefore chosen out of the big amount of organisations. However, we point out that all of them influence the security of our everyday lives, just in a broad sense of security and in a more or less indirect manner compared to traditional security-related institutions. In order to make our paper easy to understand, we first explain the development, mission and scope of all the institutions, then describe what kind of security they present and finally – if appropriate – we point out the strengths, weaknesses and mutual interdependencies and/or interactions. The involved countries are normally all EU member states; if not, we point it out.

A remark towards our experience from information research: In the press, mostly EU, OSCE, CoE and Europol occur. The other institutions are mentioned very seldomly, what reflects the pretty low intensity communication and presentation of the bodies towards the citizens and even within the websites of European institutions, there are only very limited mutual links. Furthermore, the unstandardized use of domain names is striking – abbreviations (CoE.int) or not (European-patent-office.org), sub-domains (sub-bodies of EU use XXX.eu.int) or not (sub-bodies of CoE have own domains), .org (Eurocorps) or .int (CoE) as top level domain – and seems to be reflecting the still fragmentary co-operation of European bodies.

Council of Europe (http://www.coe.int)

First, some short facts concerning dimensions: Currently, 44 countries are members of CoE, so it is made up by basically the whole European continent including the borders like Russia, Albania and Iceland (see a map). All EU-members are member of CoE, too. Over 700 million citizens live within the CoE-area. The budget for 2003 comprises 175,5 million Euro. The CoE has three central bodies (Secretary General is not seen as a body):

  1. The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe's decision-making body, and is composed of the foreign affairs ministers of all the member states (or their Permanent Representatives).
  2. The Parliamentary Assembly is the Organisation's deliberative body, the members of which are appointed by national parliaments.
  3. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe is a consultative body representing local and regional authorities.

Main development dates (mostly security related):

As one can see, the CoE provides "soft" security by setting up basic ethics and policies concerning a wide range of domains, mainly in order to counter social problems and to protect human rights, Europe's cultural identity, pluralist democracy and the rule of law.

The main strength is the high number of member states, which is at the same time the major weakness. Agreements can opt only little above the lowest common level, e.g. some countries cannot financial afford to care widely for environmental issues, but these agreements cover a huge area with a common minimum security level.

Sources: "Hacker und Kriminelle im Internet", "Gefahr für die Demokratie", "Zielobjekte und Sachschäden", "Der Entwurf der internationalen Konvention Die internationale Konvention", "Key Dates" and "Eckdaten", "Die Ächtung der Todesstrafe", "Early developments", "The Convention for the Prevention of Torture", "The Framework Convention For National Minorities", "The Council of Europe's Member States"

Europol (http://www.europol.eu.int)

Agreement of EU-countries in the 1992 Maastricht treaty, in January 1994 foundation of EDU (Europol Drugs Unit), which was replaced by Europol in July 1999. Europol is no institution of the EU (like European Parliament or The Court of Justice of the European Communities) but solely an expression of intergovernmental co-operation in internal security issues of the EU.

Europols aim is to enhance the co-operation between national polices concerning multinational organized crime (drug + radioactives trafficking, alien smuggling, terrorism, money laundry & counterfeiting, fraud with other means of payment, pornography of a paedophile nature, car crimes) and others like computer crimes, ecological crimes, illegal trafficking of arts and human organs and hormones. The main activities are support of investigations and information gathering, storing, analysis and fast exchange, including personal data of unsuspicious persons. Europol is not allowed to investigate, but only to support national institution's investigation with intelligence. Europol is only allowed to start an action, if at least two EU countries are concerned, a real clue for organized crimes exists and no country can solve the problem alone. The national sovereignty is not affected. For further enhancement of the actions, Europol has bilateral treaties with e.g. the USA, Iceland, IKPO-Interpol and European Central Bank.

Europols budget is around 30-35 million EURO and Europol has around 300 employees, including some Europol-Liasion-Officers (ELO) of the national states' police, customs and border guards. The ELOs shall accelerate the information exchange with and between the national institutions.

The main strength is that Europol as a multinational institution can aggregate more helpful information and expertise in order to fight organized crime than single national institutions could, because of legal and resource reasons.

There is a lot of criticism, which shows some major weaknesses, which can be summarized as lack of transparency, acceptance among national polices, democratic control and legitimation.

Sources: "Europa-Infoshop: Europol", "Das Europäische Kriminalpolizeiamt - Europol", "Europäisches Polizeiamt - Europol (offline, war http://www.brandenburg.de/land/mi/polizei/info110/3_99/europol.htm)"

ESA (http://www.esa.int)

ESA (European Space Agency) is planning GALILEO, a non-military global positioning system that will be compatible with US GPS and Russian GLONASS. The precision of the US and Russian systems is intentionally reduced for civil and foreign users and may completely shut off in case of war. Thus, they cannot be used for some tasks where safety is crucial, like controlling the flight of space rockets, automatic landing of planes and docking of ships etc. GALIEO enhances the security by reducing dependency from decisions of foreign governments, improving quality (high precision by using satellites of all systems + no artificial reduction) and reliability.

Sources: ESA article "What is Galileo?", "Startschuss für Galileo"

EAR (http://www.ear.eu.int)

EAR (European Agency for Reconstruction), founded in February 2000, assists reconstruction and recovery efforts in Kosovo. Main activities are
to restart public administration, to clear mines and to make urgent repairs to essential infrastructure (mainly energy, housing, transport and water supplies). Geographical extension of activities to Serbia & Montenegro in December 2000 and to Macedonia in January 2002. In 2001, the actions were widened from reconstructing physical infrastructure to helping to reconstruct societies and economies; focussing on agriculture, enterprise development (e.g. vocational training) and public administration (e.g. health, justice).
It supports the security of EU-citizens by reducing the social pressures. Thus, illegal immigration may decrease and at the same time a new civil war at the border of EU may be less likely.

Sources: http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency.htm, "The Agency today" (offline, URL war http://www.ear.eu.int/agency/agency-a1d2.htm)

European Convention on Human Rights (http://www.echr.coe.int/)

The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 is only a contract, but the covering bodies make it an institution. Since Protocol No. 11 came into force in 1998, the system was completely reformed in order to cope with the increasing amount of cases (from 404 in 1981 to 4,750 in 1997 and 13,858 in 2001). Now, individuals or states can bring their applications directly before the European Court Of Human Rights (set up in 1959 in Strasbourg) who adjudges. The Committee of [Foreign Affairs] Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the judgements.
The convention on and court of human rights give the citizens of CoE-member states some legally binding basic rights and freedoms.

Source: http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (offline)

EDQM (http://www.pheur.org)

The EDQM (European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines) is part of the administrative structure of the CoE. Based on a 1964 agreement, the European Pharmacopoeia Secretariat was formed in order to develop an European monography, regulating all important stages of pharmaceutics from development over ingredients to the marketing. Thus, throughout Europe, the quality of medicines is equal, multinational co-operation as well as trade is made possible. In 1994 the Secretariat was renamed to EDQM and enlarged by a network of Official Medicinal Control Laboratories (OMCL) to secure the quality during the whole livespan (from development until use) of medicaments.

Source: "From Pheur to EDQM", "Das pharmazeutische Europa - Historisches"

EMEA (http://www.emea.eu.int)

EMEA (the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products), established by the EU in July 1993, situated in London. It co-ordinates the scientific resources for evaluating medicinal products for human and veterinary use, so enhances the security in the domain of health.

Sources: http://www.emea.eu.int, http://www.eudra.org/

EPO (http://www.European-patent-office.org)

The EPO (European Patent Office, succeed the International Patent Institute in 1978, headquarters in Munich, Den Haag, Berlin and Vienna) grants European patents for the 24 contracting states (see map for 2001) to the European Patent Convention (EPC), which was signed in Munich on 5 October 1973. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia have finished the modernisation of their national patent systems, so they have been invited to accede to the Convention as from 1 July 2002. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia already accepted the invitation and joint in 2002. Furthermore, the EPO has bilateral agreements with Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The EPO is entirely self-financing (incomes are procedural fees and a proportion of the renewal fees for granted European patents), including an own pension scheme. The budget for 2000 was in excess of EUR 700 million. It deals with over 150,000 applications per year (49% of which are send from persons from within EPC-member countries; 40,000 in the end of 1970s) of around 700,000 world-wide.

The EPO helps to secure investments in research (think of reduced duplicated research and of countries which operate only a registration system) and to enable enterprises to pursuit a licence-based business model with a widely harmonized legal basis. It helps the economy by offering a cost-effective and timesaving procedure in comparision to 24 single patent applications with different patent grant procedures and rules.

Future perspectives: Since 1983, the EPO is closely co-operating with the Japanese Patent Office and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Moreover, the EPC is linked to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and offers a search and preliminary examination for over 100 countries. In the next decades, from the sole co-operation of several patent officees there might emerge an international patent office which could base on EPC because around 50 countries already brought their patent systems to some extend in line with the EPC.
A recent European Commission Green Paper renewed a future perspective that during this decade, there might come an EU-wide unitary patent protection (all EU-countries signed the EPC).

Sources: http://www.European-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/general/d/epo_general_d.htm, "The European Patent Office", "facts & figures 2002"

Eurocorps (http://www.eurocorps.org)

In May 1992, the Eurocorps was founded and now has 5 member states Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Spain. Army and air force can be commanded directly from the headquarter in Strasbourg, but the connection to the national navy headquarters is done by a staff officer. The regular maximum power totals 60,000 soldiers, but can be extended if the task requires member forces or non-member forces ("5 + x concept"). The Eurocorps is independent of NATO (but able to co-operate instantly because of similar structures and procedures) and is a defensive force for the EU, but can also perform peacekeeping and humanitarian actions. Thus, it is mainly an institution representing hard power, but also showing that a common, multinational defence policy is really desired.

Sources: http://www.eurocorps.org/site/index.php?language=de&content=history, "Eurocorps - a force for NATO and the EU"

EURATOM

EURATOMs goal is to help exploit the full potential of nuclear energy, both fusion and fission, in a sustainable manner, by making current technologies (including final disposal) even safer and more economical (e.g. by prolonging operational life spans of existing reactors) and thus strengthening the community's industrial competitiveness. Many problems and challenges facing the nuclear industry are common across member states. Often, there is a need to create a critical mass in human and/or financial terms. Since EURATOMs founding in 1957, the attitudes toward nuclear energy changed to a more critical point of view. Therefore new reactors are build only seldomly and existing ones will be shut down, e.g. the German government prefers regenerating energy sources and accordingly wants to replace all nuclear power plants by alternative power plants during the next 30 years. Nevertheless, Germany has signed EURATOM and therefore has still to pay 20% of the whole budged – which was increased just recently. This policy is a little bit paradoxical.

To put it in a nutshell, EURATOM is security related by trying to prolong the use of nuclear power plants and by to reduce radiation risks in European and foreign facilities.

Sources: http://www.cordis.lu/fp5-euratom/src/overview.htm, Meyers Lexikon, "TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY", "Atomkraft ja bitte!"

CERN (http://www.cern.ch)

CERN (Conseil Européenne pour la Recherche Nucléaire), founded in 1954 and situated in Geneva, is the world's largest particle physics centre, driven by 20 member states. It has an highly indirect but existing impact on security, because some technologies developed at CERN during research in particle physics are now incorporated in our daily lives, e.g. in cancer therapy (proton beams needed for production of radiopharmaceuticals; radiotherapy), medical imaging, the WWW [helps securing diversity of information sources], new manufacturing processes and materials.

Sources: http://public.web.cern.ch/public/about/useful/useful.html (new URL: http://public.web.cern.ch/public/Content/Chapters/AboutCERN/Achievements/Achievements-en.html, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/about/useful/medicine/medicine.html, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/about/what/what.html, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/about/achievements/achievements.html

Concerning computer crimes (no institution in special)

In public discussion, computer crimes are often reduced to hacking, Internet and virus threats, mostly concerning single computers and handled by national police or Europol. The possible impact is seen as low and not concentrated but decentral. In fact, a much more intense impact of a well-planned series of simple, cheap, not at all sophisticated actions is possible and realistic.

In November 2001, an exercise was performed by a working group consistent of representatives of the fields of public transportation, telecommunication, police, civil defence, power supply, major banks and big industry in the region around Berlin. It was discovered that the whole (!) infrastructure was vehemently disturbed, including economy, financial and telephony system, power supply, public transportation (road-, rail- and air-based) and political capacity to act. Public live was under heaviest pressure and locally even panic broke out. Just to recall: This was an exercise, so the impact was limited, because of e.g. short duration of attacks, advance warnings, exclusion of hospitals etc. and limitation of attacks on only single providers of each field.

Because of the global nature of the networks, national security efforts (protection and prosecution) have a very limited range. In the field of cybercrime or cyberwar, an European or even global co-operation is really needed. Unfortunately, until international political agreements are realized, decades go by, especially when politicians do not recognize the full intensity and urgency of the threat. NATO is still on the level of concepts how to proceed. EU commission already finished first studies and published the Convention on Cybercrime, but conclusions or even specific preventive programs are all still up in the air. Other European bodies are on the same stage or still have to start. Briefly, an extensive, all-including timetable towards preventive measurements is definitively out of sight.

Source: "'Cyber-Terror': Risiken im Informationszeitalter" in "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte", No. 10-11, 8./15. March 2002 (offline, URL war http://www.das-parlament.de/2002/10_11/Beilage/004.html)

 

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Conclusion (Fang & Georg)

When we introduced the institutions, we were mostly showing how they enhance the security level of the EU-citizens. One has to consider, that they can increase the threats at the same time, on an individual or even community level. For example, a young man doing the compulsory military service will be exposed to higher risks than without the army, but the community as a whole profits by the army. When ESAs GALILEO will be operating, the global community and even enemies of EU can use it and may get better possibilities for attacks against the EU due to GALILEOs high accuracy. From this point of view, GALILEO is a security risk and not a security provider.

The problem of a European foreign and security policy has remained largely unresolved, and the march towards a more convincing “consistency” among the Union’s old pillars requires additional progress along the road of effectiveness, representation, and legitimation. In short, neither the Treaty of Maastricht nor that of Amsterdam solved the problem of the persistent imbalance between the tools at the disposal of the EC and those in the hands of CFSP (Westlake, 1998, pp. 73).

In this paper, we asked what sorts of relations exist among the NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, WEU and CFSP. And what is the future for all of them related to the European Union. From Macro-view, the single voice of the Union should be represented in both the foreign (and security) policy dimension and the military power dimension, and coordination between the two must be close and automatic. Otherwise, the Union will be unable to perform its role as the international actor that recent history has assigned it.

The EU has been seen, somehow, as an “economic giant, political dwarf” (Juan Diez Medrano). The performance of the EU in the Gulf and Yugoslavian wars at the end of the 1980s promoted the public perception that without the United States’ lead, Europeans are unable to bring conflicts to a successful end. Europeans lack the resolve to apply military force in order to solve international crises. Most of the “common positions” and “common actions” undertaken by the European Union to pursue political goals have been economic. Beyond organizational considerations related to the way the European Union makes decisions on foreign policy and security, it has become increasingly evident that the EU cannot exert a role in foreign affairs commensurate to its economic strength unless it has control over military forces of its own.

Diplomatic disunity was one factor behind the EU’s poor performance during the war in Yugoslavia. The other significant factor was the WEU’s lack of the operational capability to conduct military actions independently of NATO, had the will to act existed (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 172). We argue that the relatively poor performance of the European Union in recent international crises is due not to lack of integration, but to lack of operational capability in the area of defense and divisions between the European Union member states.

Despite movement towards a CFSP, the EU remains plagued by doubts and problems over military cooperation; the OSCE encountered difficulties in moving from a negotiating body to one with a more proactive role; the WEU has a somewhat unclear relationship with NATO and the EU; while NATO has yet to find a credible role to ensure its survival as a pivotal force in European security. This uncertainty means that there is no clear framework of institutions with clearly defined roles and functions to provide security – particularly military security – in Europe (Rees, 1993). Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that as the remaining instutions develop, so they may find themselves in competition with other institutions for particular roles. At risk is not merely the credibility and survival of these institutions, but effective management of security issues if states are divided over the institutions best placed to serve particular needs.

In recent international crises, the EU has given the impression of lacking the resolve and capacity to solve them successfully (Hill, 1993). It is criticized for lacking the political muscle that would correspond to its economic strength, which puts it in the same league as Japan and Germany, two economic giants with little political weight on the world scene (Gnesotto, 1996). The efficacy or role of the EU in international politics is hampered not by the lack of integration in the foreign affairs and security area but by a lack of common interests and by low operational capability. In areas where European Union states agree that they have a common interest, such as commercial policy, development aid, and security, they have been quite effective, but in other areas, where a perceived common interest did not exist or a very sophisticated military capability was needed, they have been less effective. Steps toward integration in CFSP are unlikely in the short term and that the EU will try to assert its military autonomy Vis a Vis the USA, both by strengthening the WEU and by penetrating the NATO structures (Paul & Hall, 1999, pp. 174). The role of the EU in international affairs will in all like likehood remains hostage to the differences of interest that exist between its major states.

References (Fang)

Borchardt, Klaus-Dieter, 2000, The ABC of Community Law, European Commission, Brussels

Bonvicini, Gianni, 1988, Mechanisms and Procedures of EPC: More than Traditional Diplomacy?, M. Nijthoff Publishers, The Netherlands

Dumoulin, Andre, 1995, L’UEO et la politique europeenne de defense, Documentation Francaise, Paris

Fabre, Dominique, 1996, La politique etrangere et de securite commune (PESC), Documentation Francaise, Paris

Gnesotto, Nicole, 1996, La defense europeenne au carrefour de la Bosnie et de la CIG, Institut francais des relations internationales, Paris

Hill, C. 1993, The Capability Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role, Journal of Common Market Studies, no. 3, September

Hoffmann, Stanley, 1991, Balance, Concert, Anarchy, or None of the Above, in Gregory F. Treverton (ed.), The Shape of the New Europe, Council on Foreign Relations Press, pp. 194 – 220, New York

Keohane, Robert and Hoffmann, Stanley, 1992, Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change, Pinter Publishers, London

Keohane, Robert K. 1984, After Hegemony, Princeton University Press, Princeton

Morrow, James D. 1994, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information, International Organization 48: 387 – 423

Paul, T. V. & Hall, John A. 1999, International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Rees, G. Wyn, 1993, International Politics In Europe, Routledge, London

Westlake, Martin, 1998, The European Union Beyond Amsterdam, Routledge, London

http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en, Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy

http://www.coe.int, The Council Of Europe

http://www.europol.eu.int, The Europol

http://www.esa.int, ESA

http://www.ear.eu.int, EAR

http://www.European-patent-office.org, EPO

and all other links and papers mentioned directly in the text



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